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A multi-sided platform (MSP) serves as an intermediary for two or 
more groups of customers who are linked by indirect network effects.  Recent 
research has found that MSPs are significant in many industries and that some 
standard economic results—such as the Lerner Index—do not apply to them, 
in material ways, without some significant modification to take linkages 
between the multiple sides into account.   This article extends several key 
tools used for the analysis of mergers to situations in which one or more of 
the suppliers are MSPs. It shows that the application of traditional tools to 
mergers involving MSPs results in biases the direction of which depends on 
the particular tool being used and other conditions. It also extends these tools 
to the analysis of the merger of MSPs. The techniques are illustrated with an 
application to an acquisition by Google in the online advertising industry.    













I.  INTRODUCTION 
This article presents an empirical framework for examining market definition 
and unilateral effects in mergers in which one or more of the businesses that may be 
considered for the hypothetical market are multi-sided platforms (MSPs). MSPs 
provide goods or services to several distinct groups of customers who need each 
other in some way and who rely on the platform to intermediate transactions between 
them (Evans (2003a, b), Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006)).
1 They typically reduce 
transaction costs and thereby permit value-creating exchanges to take place that 
otherwise would not occur (Evans and Schmalensee (2007a, b)). In particular they 
facilitate the realization of indirect network externalities, and externalities in use, 
between the members of distinct customer groups (Rochet and Tirole (2003)).  
Many old industries are based on MSPs, ranging from village matchmakers 
that date from ancient times to advertising-supported newspapers introduced in the 
17
th century to payment cards introduced in the mid 20
th century. However, an 
increasing number of significant modern businesses are MSPs as a result of 
technological changes that have drastically lowered the costs and increased the 
benefits of connecting diverse customer groups on a single platform.  These include 
most internet-based businesses such as eBay, Facebook, and Google.  Such 
businesses are creating new products and services such as social networking and are 
disrupting existing industries such as advertising-supported media (Evans and 
Schmalensee (2007b)). 
MSPs are likely to become an increasingly important part of merger and 
antitrust analysis in the years to come for several reasons.  
•  With the relative increase in the birth of MSPs more businesses will 
be based on this rather than the traditional supply-chain model in 
which raw materials are turned into products that are sold to wholesale 
and then to retail distributors. 
                                                 
1 Many multi-sided platforms have two primary sides such as advertising and readers, and much of the economic 
literature has focused on the case of two-sided platforms (2SPs). We will discuss it as well later in this paper.  
 
 









•  MSPs are prevalent in new industries that are going through 
consolidations based on mergers and acquisitions which must be 
reviewed by antitrust authorities. Recent examples include the 
proposed merger of Euronext and the London Stock Exchange, and 
Google’s acquisition of DoubleClick discussed in more detail later. 
•  Indirect network effects tend to lead to high levels of concentration 
(see Evans and Schmalensee (2007a)) in industries which in turn leads 
to increased merger and antitrust scrutiny. 
•  Modern MSPs are sometimes locked in battle with other MSPs for 
control of an industry and are disruptive forces in traditional 
industries. In both cases this leads to competitors being harmed and 
complaints being lodged. 
•  MSPs have business models that are not yet well understood and 
engage in highly complex business strategies; unusual practices are 
suspect practices in our experience (Evans and Schmalensee 
(2007b)).
2 
The standard tools of antitrust and merger analysis, which were developed 
based on the economics of single-sided businesses, do not necessarily apply in ways 
                                                 
2 Indeed, some of the most visible antitrust cases around the turn of the 21st century have involved MSPs. These 
include the Microsoft cases in the United States (see Microsoft v United States, Supreme Court Docet No. 01-
236), the European Community (see Microsoft v Commission, T-201/04), and Korea (KFTC v Microsoft, 
decision available at http://ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/micorsoft_case.pdf), all of which involve various aspects of the 
Windows software platform; the credit-card interchange fee cases in Australia(see Visa International Service 
Association v Reserve Bank Of Australia, N 973 of 2002), the European Union (see European Commission, 
“Interim Report I Payment Cards”, Apr. 12, 2006), the United Kingdom (see Office of Fair Trading v MasterCard 
UK Members Forum Limited, CA98/05/05), the United States (see United States of America v Visa U.S.A. Inc., 
Visa International Corp., And MasterCard International Incorporated, 98 Civ. 7076 (BSJ) ), and many other 
jurisdictions; mobile termination charges cases involving pricing to one side of a two-sided market that have 
appeared in the European Community (see Vodafone / Oskar Mobile, Case No. COMP/M.3776; Cellnet and 
Vodafone, Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Report to the Director General of Telecommunications, 
December 1998; “Decrease of the Price of Fixed-to-mobile Calls”, Autorité de Regulation des 
Telecommunications, Press Release, 6 November 2002; Competition Commission (2003), “Vodafone, O2, 
Orange, and T-Mobile: Reports on References under Section 13 of the Telecommunications Act of 1984 on the 
charges made by Vodafone, O2, Orange and T-Mobile for terminating calls from fixed and mobile networks”); 
and the U.S. Department of Justice case involving realtor.com (see United States of America  v. National 
Association of Realtors, Civil Action No. 05 C 5140); and actual and proposed mergers involving stock 
exchanges (e.g. NYSE and Euronext; Euronext and London Stock Exchange; London Stock Exchange and 














that are material to the analysis of competition that involves multi-sided businesses. 
Each side of the MSP's business influences and constrains its strategies on the other 
side. Antitrust analysis that focuses on one side of the business in isolation from the 
other side is incorrect as a matter of economics, and can lead to the wrong answer 
when indirect network effects are significant and are relevant for assessing the 
practice at issue (Evans (2003a), Wright (2004)).  This article shows how the 
standard tools used for analyzing market definition and unilateral effects for mergers 
need to be modified when the parties are MSPs. The analysis of market definition 
and power has obvious extensions to other areas of antitrust. 
  We present an empirical framework that can be used to handle situations in 
which one or more MSPs may be the subject of the merger analysis.  Section 2 
provides an informal discussion of the analysis of market definition, market power, 
and unilateral effects for situations that involve MSPs and how that analysis differs 
from that for situations that only involve single-sided firms. Section 3 then presents 
our formal analysis for the special case of two-sided markets. Section 4 considers a 
series of examples and simulations to highlight the benefits of pursuing the correct 
analysis. Section 5 applies the analysis to analyzing unilateral effects for a particular 
example: Google’s purchase of DoubleClick. Section 6 presents brief conclusions.  
II. ANALYSIS OF MARKETS WITH MULTI-SIDED PLATFORMS 
Consider profit maximization for a platform that serves customers groups A 
and B. Suppose the platform has already established prices for both groups and is 
considering changing them.
3 If it raises the price for members of group A, fewer A's 
will join. If nothing else changed, the relationship between price and the number of 
A's would depend on the price elasticity of demand for A's. Since, however, members 
of group B value the platform more if there are more A's, fewer B's will join the 
platform at the current price for B's. That drop-off depends on the indirect network 
                                                 
3 To keep matters simple we consider the case where each side is charged a membership fee as in Armstrong and 
Wright (2007).  MSPs generally involve platforms on which interactions take place customers face an access fee 
and a usage fee although they may choose to make some of those fees zero.  
 
 









externality which is measured by the value that B's place on A's. But with fewer B's 
on the platform, A's also value the platform less leading to a further drop in their 
demand. There is a feedback loop between the two sides. Once this is taken into 
account the effect of an increase in price on one side is a decrease in demand on the 
first side because of the direct effect of the price elasticity of demand and on both 
sides as a result of the indirect effects from the externalities. The change in revenue 
from a change in the price for A’s therefore depends on the price elasticity of demand 
for A's and the indirect network effects between the two sides. Costs necessarily go 
down so long as marginal costs are positive since the number of customers has 
dropped on both sides. As is always the case with profit maximization, the price 
increase is profitable if revenues do not decline more than costs decline. 
The platform would like to find the prices for each side that maximize its 
profits by taking these considerations into account. As Rochet and Tirole (2003) 
observe, one can think of these as determining the absolute and relative levels of 
prices. Three key results hold for two-sided platforms based only on the assumptions 
that there are two distinct customer groups, there are positive externalities between 
members of those groups, and a two-sided platform provides a good or service that 
facilitates exchange of value between the two customer groups in the face of these 
externalities: 
•  First, each optimal price depends on the price elasticities of demand for both 
sides; the nature and intensity of the indirect network effects between each 
side; and the marginal costs that result from changing output of each side. For 
the special case considered by Rochet and Tirole (2003) the profit-
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•  Second, an increase in marginal cost on one side does not necessarily result in 
an increase in price on that side relative to the price of the other side. From 
(1) we have   
 
 

















=                                                          (2) 
which means the price ratio between two sides depends only on the ratio of 
elasticities (and not inverse elasticities), but not on marginal cost.  
•  Third, the profit-maximizing price for one side may be below the marginal 
cost of supply for that side or even negative.  A common situation analyzed 
by Armstrong (2006) is when the platform in effect buys A’s who are valued 
by B’s. 
More generally, the relationship between price and cost is complex, and the simple 
formulas that have been derived for single-sided markets do not apply.  
    Several results that are relevant for the analysis of market definition and 
unilateral effects follow immediately from these results.  In describing these results 
we distinguish between mergers between “symmetric” MSPs which are defined as 
MSPs that serve coincident sides and “asymmetric” MSPs which are defined as 
MSPs that do not have at least one side in common. 








                                                          (3) 
where η is the usual own-price elasticity of demand, does not accurately summarize 
the profit-maximizing equilibrium for MSPs when applied to a particular side. This 
condition does not consider the linkage between the two sides and as a result does not 
reflect the profit-maximizing equilibrium condition for a two-sided platform.  For the 
special case considered by Rochet and Tirole (2003) the two-sided version of the 
Lerner Index is 
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Merger analyses such as the critical loss and diversion ratio that are based on the one-
sided Lerner Index are therefore not correct when applied to multi-sided businesses.
4  
     Merger simulation models are also misspecified when they fail to consider 
the multi-sided nature of the business.
5  Consider the standard conditional logit 
equation that underlies the basic models for differentiated-product industries: 






















η                               (5) 
When applied to one side of a two-sided industry this equation fails to consider the 
feedback effects between the two sides—in other words that the demand  by side A 
depends on the number of customers on side B—and that one must consider the 
demand by sides A and B simultaneously to properly account for all the feedback 
effects. 
    The SSNIP test for defining a relevant market does not apply without 
significant modifications when any of products involved in the analysis are produced 
by an MSP. Consider the case of a merger between two symmetric MSPs that serve 
the same customer groups A and B.  To define the market an analyst proceeds by 
starting with the merger of the products that serve demand for, say, side A because 
that is the focus of the competition concern.
6  The set of products is expanded until a 
hypothetical monopolist over that set of products could raise price by, say, 5 percent 
or more on each of those products. That set of products then defines the market for 
analysis.  However, by ignoring side B the analyst fails to consider that the 
hypothetical price increase reduces the number of side A customers available to side 
B, which thereby reduces the prices that side B customers will pay, and furthermore 
reduces the number of side B customers available to side A, which in turn reduces 
the prices that side A customers will pay. The link between sides A and B reduces the 
                                                 
4 We discuss this in detail below. 
5 See Werden, Gregory J & Froeb, Luke M (1994); Baker, J., and T. Bresnahan (1985); Feldman, R. (1994); 
and Nevo, A. (2000). 
6 For a discussion of the SSNIP test see US Department of Justice Merger Guidelines available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/hmg1.html.  In particular see Section 1 on Market 
Definition, Measurement and Concentration.  
 
 









profitability of any price increase.  The market defined by a one-sided application of 
the SSNIP test is necessarily drawn too narrowly from an otherwise properly 
conducted single sided approach because it fails to consider the tempering effects on 
price coming from the other side.
7 
    The mistake though is more profound.  The purpose of market definition is, in 
part, to help focus the economic analysis on a relevant but finite set of products and 
competitive relationships for analysis.  For industries in which the multi-sided effects 
are sufficiently strong, market definition that excludes one of the sides of an MSP 
results in the failure to consider multi-sided strategies and market linkages. Failure to 
consider those multi-sided relationships can result in Type I and Type II errors: 
failing to recognize practices that may be harmful because of the two-sided 
relationships and condemning practices that are innocuous in a two-sided context. 
    The remainder of this paper provides the toolkit for conducting merger and 
unilateral effects analyses for MSPs.  
III.  CRITICAL LOSS ANALYSIS FOR MULTI-SIDED PLATFORMS 
    Economists have developed a number of techniques to assess market 
definition and the competitive consequences of a merger following seminal 
contributions by Farrell and Shapiro (1990), Willig (1991), and Werden and Froeb 
(1994). This work and subsequent contributions build on the fundamental insight that 
one can infer own-price elasticities of demand from price-cost margins (the Lerner 
Index) and use these estimated elasticities to conduct a variety of simple analyses.  
Given enough data one can also evaluate the effects of a merger by estimating a 
demand system under some assumptions (such as differentiated-market Bertrand) 
about strategic interactions (see Ivaldi and Verboven (2005)).  
                                                 
7 The direction of this bias can be definitively signed when the platforms are symmetric, or alternatively when the 
price changes deemed significant (e.g. 5%) are symmetric across products, which is standard in market definition 
exercises. The bias can go in either direction when both 1) asymmetric platforms are involved and 2) asymmetric 
price changes are considered, as may occur in many merger analyses. Other opposing biases arise from particular 
calibration techniques commonly used in one-sided analyses. These will be discussed in detail later.  
 
 









    This section uses one of the most popular parsimonious techniques – critical 
loss analysis – to show how these techniques can be extended and modified for 
mergers involving MSPs. We begin with a brief overview of one-sided critical loss 
analysis and then introduce the two-sided variant.  
A.  One-Sided Critical Loss 
    Critical Loss Analysis was introduced by Harris and Simons (1989) as a user-
friendly implementation of the SSNIP test.
8  It compares “Critical Loss” (CL) – the 
percentage loss in quantity of a hypothetical monopolist’s products that would be 
exactly enough to make an  % X  price increase in the price of all its products 
unprofitable – to “Actual Loss” (AL) – the predicted percentage loss in quantity that 
the monopolist would suffer if it did increase prices on all its products by  % X . With 
symmetric one-sided firms, the well known formulas are given by  ) /( M X X CL + =  
and ) (
CROSS OWN X AL ε ε − = , where M is the percentage markup, and 
OWN ε  and 
CROSS ε  are the own and cross price elasticities respectively. The relevant market is 
found when Actual Loss equals Critical Loss for a hypothetical monopolist of the 
given set of products in the proposed antitrust market. If Actual Loss exceeds Critical 
Loss, the relevant market is expanded to include more substitutes. Otherwise, it is 
contracted.  
    Critical Loss Analysis has also been used to estimate unilateral price effects 
from proposed mergers. In this context, one inquires whether the merger of the 
parties would lead the merged firm to raise prices by X% or more. If the test shows 
that Actual Loss exceeds Critical Loss, the merged entity would not find an  % X  
price increase in all its products profitable. Otherwise, it would find it profitable.  
This provides only a first look at whether there are significant unilateral effects and 
more sophisticated techniques would ordinarily be used to confirm this initial 
finding. 
                                                 
8 See Harris and Simons (1989), O’Brien and Wickelgren (2003) and Katz & Shapiro (2003). See Harris and 
Veljanovski (2003) for discussion of the use of critical loss analysis in antitrust proceedings.  
 
 









    The one-sided calculations are trivial, and the technique has won widespread 
appeal both because of its simplicity and easy measurement of inputs.
9 
B.  Two-Sided Critical Loss 
We now show the one-sided formulas given above are analytically wrong 
when they are applied to markets involving MSPs. When an MSP increases the price 
to customers on one side of its business, it results not only in a loss of customers on 
that side but also a loss of customers on the other side of the market. This in turn 
causes a shift in the relative and absolute sizes of all platforms in the market, giving 
rise to further implications. The direction of the bias from using one-sided formulas 
depends upon the analytical method being used and the nature of the differences 
between the MSPs. 
For our exposition of the biases from the use of one-sided formulas when 
MSPs are involved, we consider the case of two symmetric platforms serving two 
distinct customer groups. We return to the cases of asymmetric platforms that do not 
have all sides in common and MSPs with N>2 in the appendix. There are two 
opposite biases –  “Estimation Bias” and “Lerner Bias” – that occur depending on the 
estimation technique, and in the symmetric case the direction of the biases is 
unambiguous.  
Estimation Bias. Suppose the analyst estimates a demand system for one of 
the products offered by two-sided platforms using data and following the techniques 
that give an unbiased estimate of the short-run own-price elasticity of demand. Here 
we define short-run to represent the length of time it takes for customers who 
experience a price increase directly to respond, but before any feedback effects 
commence. (The feedback effects, we know, will cause additional indirect responses 
                                                 
9 One could also calculate and compare profit totals directly across hypothetical and real worlds. The sum of firm 
profits before is π = 2Mpq, and the joint profit after is π
i = 2pq(M+X)(1+X(ε
OWN – ε
CROSS)). We, however, 
maintain the Critical Loss formulation throughout the paper because of its appeal, its transparency (over black 













over time as relative and absolute platform sizes change.
10) Since the analyst’s 
estimate does not account for feedback effects, the full impact of the price increase 
on demand is underestimated. As a result, antitrust markets will be defined too 
narrowly, and merger analysis will overstate the increase in market power of merging 
parties and overstate the predicted unilateral price effects of the transaction. 
Lerner Bias. An opposite bias can occur when the analyst uses observed 
markups to calibrate the own elasticity of demand based on the one-sided Lerner 
Index. This bias overstates the true short-run own-price elasticity of demand. In fact, 
it yields an elasticity estimate that is even larger than the true long-run own-price 
elasticity of demand. We define long-run to be as long as necessary for all 
meaningful feedback effects to be worked out, from the consequent changes in 
platform size.
11 In this case, the resulting market definition would be too broad and 
predicted unilateral effects of a transaction would be too small. 
The situation is more complex with asymmetric platforms. When the test 
considers equal price changes (e.g. 5%) across all of the hypothetical monopolist’s 
products, the biases are as above. However, if the asymmetry is significant and if the 
analyst allows for differential price changes across products, the direction of the 
overall bias depends on the analytical method and also the relative and absolute sizes 
of the price increase(s) considered. Differential price changes are more likely to be a 
consideration in the analysis of unilateral effects, where antitrust concern may center 
around particular products, rather than in market definition analyses, where the price 
increases deemed to be significant are generally taken as uniform (e.g. 5% or 10%) 
under the SSNIP test. Imagine a merger between a low-margin and high-margin (in 
absolute terms) platform and imagine there is concern that the prices will increase at 
the low margin platform only. Given properly estimated short-run elasticities, the 
one-sided calculation underestimates the loss on the low margin platform, but misses 
                                                 
10 In practice, most likely the analyst will estimate some unknown mix of a short-run and long-run elasticity (i.e. 
once all feedback effects have been worked out), since indirect network effects from platform size changes are 
not properly accounted for. The direction of bias is the same. 
11 Our definitions of “short” and “long” are defined to be the periods in which the direct price responses and 
meaningful indirect price effects take place, respectively. They do not relate to calendar time and are different 
from the concepts of short- and long-run (+/- one or two years) generally used by antitrust practitioners.  
 
 









entirely the positive gain to the high-margin platform. If enough customers would 
switch to the high-margin platform, the one-sided calculation understates the 
unilateral price effects of the transaction. This possibility turns out to be significant 
in our discussion of the Google-DoubleClick merger in Section V. 
Our exposition returns to the symmetric case. Call the platforms firm 1 and 
firm 2, and the two groups of customers A and B. Note that platform symmetry 
implies 
A A A P P P 2 1 = =  and 
B B B P P P 2 1 = = ; we do not assume symmetry across the 
two sides, 
B A P P ≠ , which are typically quite different in practice. Also, define total 
quantity across platforms on side s as 
s s s Q Q Q 2 1 + = . 
Imagine that a hypothetical monopolist of both two-sided platforms wished to 
increase prices to the consumers on side A by
A P ∆  and to consumers on side B 
by
B P ∆ . Similar to the one-sided case, the gain on inframarginal sales due to the 
price increase on side A would be: 
) (
A A A Q Q P ∆ + ∆                                                       (6) 
However, unlike the one-sided case, the marginal loss due to the price increase on 
side A now consists of two components: 
B B B A A A Q C P Q C P ∆ − − ∆ − − ) ( ) (                                          (7) 
the loss on side A and the loss on side B due to the price increase on A.
12 Here, 
marginal costs are denoted by 
A C  and 
B C , and 
s Q ∆ represents the loss in total 
quantity on sides over the time period that is relevant for the merger review 
(typically one or two years).  Similar equations are derived for the price increase on 
side B. Summing up and equating the gains to the losses, we get the Two-Sided 
Critical Loss Formula in response to changes in the prices on side A and B of  %
A X  
and  %
B X  respectively: 
                                                 
12 The merger guidelines state that when determining the relevant antitrust market “the terms of sale of all other 
products [outside the proposed antitrust market] are held constant”. In general, we would expect a hypothetical 
monopolist to adjust prices on side B as well as on side A. This and subsequent formulas account for both cases.  
 
 
























s s s X R
Q
Q
M X R                                     (8)           
where 
s s s P Q R = , the revenue earned from side s. Critical Loss is the set of 
percentage quantity reductions on side A, 
A A Q Q / ∆ , and side B, 
B B Q Q / ∆ , that 
would leave the hypothetical monopolist profits unchanged.
13  
 The  Actual Loss to the hypothetical MSP monopolist depends on several 
factors. As with one-sided firms, Actual Loss depends on the (short-run) own-price 
and cross-price elasticities of demand. Higher own price elasticities tend to increase 
Actual Loss since a price increase at a given platform results in relatively more 
customers switching away from that platform. On the other hand, higher (short-run) 
cross price elasticities between the monopolist’s platforms tend to decrease Actual 
Loss because relatively more of the customers that switched away from one platform 
can be recaptured with the monopolist’s other platform.  
Unlike one-sided firms, Actual Loss also depends on the strength of the 
indirect network externalities that customer groups provide to one another. Recall 
that an MSP is only successful because it is able to bring two distinct customer 
groups together in significant numbers. When an MSP increases its price on side s for 
platform i, there is the usual contraction in demand on side s, as with one-sided firms. 
But now because there are fewer side s customers, the platform is less valuable to 
side r customers. This causes a contraction on side r as well. The feedback effects 
take over, causing another contraction of s side, then r side again, and so on. The 
stronger the externality across groups, the greater the demand contractions will be 
after a price increase and the greater is the Actual Loss, all else equal. 
                                                 
13 A special case is when the two sides are tied together in a fixed proportion, e.g. a transaction market like credit 
card services, where a transaction takes place between a customer on side A (a card holder) and a customer on 
side B (a merchant). Suppose the proposed antitrust market is the transaction, which by definition includes both 
sides. Given  B A Q Q Q = =  and  % 5 = =
B A X X , equation (8) collapses to:  ) /( /
AB M X X Q Q + = ∆  where 
)) /( ) (
B A B A B A AB P P C C P P M + − − + = . This is the familiar one-sided Critical Loss formula where the “product” is 
the transaction with a composite price of  AB pp + .  
 
 









The exact Actual Loss formula depends on the specific demand form chosen. 
We consider, as an example, an isoelastic demand function adapted to include the 
special features of MSPs.
















i p p where q q q γ β µ θ θ δ α + − = + − =  
i ≠ j, s ≠ r, where 
s
i q  = ln(
s
i Q ) is the log quantity demanded by side s customers at 
platform i, 
s
i p  = ln(
s
i P ) is log price to side s on platform i, and parameters αs , βs, 
and δs are non-negative. Since we assume competing platforms, γs is non-negative as 
well.
15 Given the log-log form, the β’s and γ’s are the usual short-run own and cross 
price elasticities for side s customers respectively. Recall that we define short-run to 
include the time needed for the direct response of customers impacted by the price 
increase but too short to include any of the indirect network feedback effects that 
follow. The indirect network externalities (the marginal value one side puts on the 
presence of the other at a platform) are captured by αs, the within-platform cross-side 
externality, and δs, the cross-platform cross-side externality.
16 The αs, for example, is 
the percentage change in quantity demanded by side s at platform i in response to a 
one percent change in the quantity of platform i’s side r customers. We assume αs > 
δs, βs > γs, and αs + δs<1 to ensure stability of the system.
17 
  Solving for the reduced form equations of the 
s
i q ’s (as a function only of 
prices), and taking the total derivative of each 
s
i q , we derive the formula for Actual 
Loss to side A customers after price increases to side A and side B of  %
A X  and 
%
B X  respectively: 
                                                 
14 The results of the article carry through to other commonly used demand formulations. 
15 This demand system can be derived from a standard exogenous differentiated goods approach with an 
additional term included that is increasing in the consumption of consumers on the other side. 
16 The same formulas apply whether firms multi-home or single-home. While it does not change the structure of 
the demand system, it would be expected to impact estimates of the parameters.  
17 The first condition ensures demand on the other side of both platforms does not increase after a price increase 
and demand contraction at both platforms on the first side. The second ensures demand does not increase on both 
sides after a price increase on one side by both platforms. The third prevents exploding demand following a price 
increase on one side by one platform.  
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i q ∆  = 
A Q ln ∆  = 
A A Q Q / ∆  (since platforms are symmetric), once 
all feedback effects have been worked out. The formula for the Actual Loss on side B 
is similar. 
  We see the two-sided Actual Loss formula for side A is a generalization of 
the one-sided formula. When all cross-side externalities are zero, so that each group’s 
demands do not depend on the numbers of customers on the other side at either 
platform, the formulas for L
A and L
B coincide with their one-sided counterparts.  
When two-sided externalities are present, however, it is necessarily the case with 
symmetric platforms that the correct two-sided formulas give larger Actual Loss 
estimates than the one-sided versions, given otherwise unbiased estimates of the 
short-run price elasticities.  
There are two reasons for the “Estimation Bias” here. First, an increase in 
price on side A alone causes not only a reduction in demand on side A but also a 
reduction in demand on side B, since the B group values a platform less when there 
are fewer A’s. So, unlike the one-sided case, there are losses on both sides (L
A < 0 
and L
B < 0).  
Second, and importantly, there is a multiplier effect in two-sided industries 
that magnifies the immediate loss on side A and on side B over time. As discussed 
above, when side A contracts after its price increases, the platform is less valuable to 
its B customers and the B side contracts. But fewer B’s decreases the value of the 
platform to the A customers and now the A side contracts further. Both sides contract 
in turn, and as a result the Actual Losses are larger than they would be in a one-sided 
world where absolute and relative platform size does not matter.  
The multiplier effect can be seen in the denominator of the two-sided Actual 
Loss formulas. The denominator is necessarily less than one, so the two-sided Actual  
 
 









Loss formulas necessarily yield larger estimates of loss than the one-sided formulas, 
for a given set of parameters. The biased one-sided versions overestimate the 
hypothetical monopolist’s ability to raise prices. 
To calculate whether a given price increase or increases are likely to be 
profitable, one simply compares Critical Loss and Actual Loss, by substituting the 
values of L
s into 
s s Q Q / ∆  in the Critical Loss equation (8). If the left hand side of 
(8) is negative, the price increase(s) will not be profitable. If positive, the price 
increase(s) will be profitable.  
In merger analyses, the test would be performed using just the set of products 
or services that the newly merged firm would control. The merged entity is de facto 
the hypothetical monopolist and assumptions about possible cost efficiencies post-
merger are easily worked into the analysis. In market definition exercises this test is 
repeated many times, each time expanding or contracting the proposed antitrust 
market, until a market is found where Critical Loss would equal Actual Loss for a 
hypothetical monopolist of all the products in that market. Given a market definition, 
the market shares of the “in” firms are calculated and then used as proxies for market 
power. 
There are many reasons to be wary of mechanical market definition exercises 
such as this SSNIP test, or in relying on artificially discrete market boundaries.
18 
However, for better or worse the SSNIP test is commonly used, and our purpose here 
is just to show that the one-sided formulas are simply wrong when MSPs are 
involved. The underestimation of Actual Loss means relevant antitrust markets 
defined on the basis one-sided formulas will be narrower than they would be under 
the correct two-sided calculations, and estimates of market power too high. 
It is generally preferable to estimate all the parameters of the demand system 
whenever reliable data exists.
19 In practice, data availability is such that often 
                                                 
18 See Carlton (2007) for further discussion. 
19 There are several empirical papers that estimate two-sided demand systems in particular industries in order to 
establish the existence of indirect network effects. Although generally not in the context of merger or market 
definition analysis, these highlight the importance and challenges of proper demand identification in a two-sided  
 
 









parameters must be calibrated with limited information. Theoretical restrictions, like 
the Lerner Index that relate markups and elasticities, can be used to calibrate 
parameters that otherwise may be difficult or impossible to estimate. Other 
theoretical restrictions, like the Slutsky Symmetry rule that relates cross-price 
elasticities, can be used to ensure logical consistency across certain parameters.  
The relationship between markups and elasticities is especially important here 
because markups appear in the Critical Loss formula and the elasticities appear in the 
Actual Loss formulas. This relationship should be consistent with economic theory.
 20 
In calibration exercises, it is now common practice to use the (one-sided) Lerner 
Index to estimate the own price elasticity from the observed markup when the latter 
cannot be estimated from data, perhaps because data are lacking or the analyst has 
insufficient time. This turns out to be a problem in two-sided settings. The one-sided 
Lerner Index is incorrect for MSPs and relying on it overestimates the true short-run 
own price elasticity of demand and overstates Actual Loss.  
It is well known in the one-sided case that the percentage markup equals the 
inverse of the own price elasticity at the profit maximizing output. In the two-sided 
case, we can derive the first order conditions for profit maximization. Each platform i 
chooses prices on each side to maximize: 
, ,










                                       (10) 
The two first order conditions simplify to: 
                                                                                                                                           
context. For example, see Rysman (2004) establishing a link between readers and advertisers in the yellow pages 
market, Rysman (2007) for cardholders and merchants in the payment card industry, Argentesi and Filistrucchi 
(2005) for readers and advertisers in the Italian magazine industry with an estimation of market power, Wright 
(2004) and Kaiser and Wright (2006) for linking readers and advertisers in the German magazine industry and 
Dubois, Hernandez-Perez, and Ivaldi (2007) linking readers and authors in the academic publishing industry. 
Argentesi and Ivaldi (2005) recap antitrust cases involving market definition in (two-sided) media industries. 
Using limited data for the French magazine market, they include an estimation of subscriber demand elasticities 
using the price of advertising as an instrument, suggesting a two-sided linkage. Elasticity estimates differ with 
and without the instrument. 
20 Some authors disregard the Lerner index as too simple and unrealistic for application in specific real-world 
antitrust cases (see Scheffman and Simons (2003) and Harris (2003)). We agree with Katz and Shapiro (2003) 
that there should be a presumption of the theoretical markup-elasticity relationship pending evidence to the 
contrary. It is possible, however, to estimate both markups and elasticities independently of one another directly 
from the data and sidestep these issues.  
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ii ε  and 
sr
ii ε  the long-run own-price elasticity and the long-run cross-side 
price elasticity, in absolute value, once all feedback effects have been worked out. 
The i subscripts on the ε’s indicate these are elasticities with respect to changes in the 
price of the side s good by firm i only.  
The first order conditions do not reproduce the one-sided Lerner Index 
formula. They do not even uniquely identify the values of the own price elasticities 
from the markups, but rather only constrain the relationship between the own and 
cross price elasticities and the indirect network externalities.  
  To see the “Lerner Bias” most easily, imagine for a moment symmetry across 








i M ε ε . Now note that the long-run own price elasticity, 
ss
ii ε , is 
necessarily larger than β (the usual short-run own price elasticity), due to the indirect 
network effects. The long-run cross-side price elasticity, 
sr
ii ε , which is zero in a truly 
one-sided industry, is greater than zero in absolute value here.
21 Consequently, for a 
given set of elasticity estimates, equilibrium markups are lower that the one-sided 
Lerner Index would imply. The converse is that for a given set of markups observed 
in the data, the true short-run own-price elasticities of demand are lower than the 
one-sided Lerner Index would suggest. The reason is that the indirect network 
                                                 
21 Recall this is the long run change in quantity on side r at platform i due to a change in the price of side s at 
platform i, once all feedback effects have been worked out. There is no direct effect of side s prices on side r 
demand, but there is an indirect effect of side s prices on side r demand for two-sided platforms, via changes in 
side s demand.   
 
 









externalities penalize price increases more, so the short-run own price elasticity must 
be especially low in order to support markups at a given level. 
The bias is strong – since  0 >
sr
ii ε , the one-sided estimate is even larger than 
the true long-run own-price elasticity, and this results in a bias in the opposite 
direction. Market definitions will be set too large, or the expected price increases 
from a merger will be assumed too small. 
The comparative statics of the two-sided markup equations give insight into 
the problem. As with the one-sided calculation, a higher short-run own elasticity β 
(which increased both 
ss
ii ε  and 
sr
ii ε ) lowers markups. But unlike the one-sided case, a 
higher short-run cross price elasticity of demand γ  also results in lower markups 
(again increasing 
ss
ii ε  and 
sr
ii ε ). The reason is that a higher cross price elasticity 
causes a higher proportion of the side A customers who switch after a side A price 
increase to buy from platform j rather than buy nothing instead. Since platforms are 
two-sided, the relative value of firm i’s platform to the side B customers falls when 
more A’s move to j, causing a demand contraction on the B side as well. The 
feedback effects begin, and platform i contracts further.  
Greater indirect network externalities also work to decrease markups. First, 
by raising price a platform triggers the market shrinking feedback effect causing its 
demand to repeatedly contract on each side. It is easiest to see this by noting 
s
i M  = 
(1 – α)/β when δ = 0 in the symmetric case. A greater cross-side own-platform 
externality α penalizes price increases more and acts to lower equilibrium markups. 
Second, and surprisingly, a higher cross-side cross-platform externality δ also 
acts to lower markups. To see this, note that 
s
i M  = (1 – (α + δ))/β as γ → β in the 
limit in the symmetric case. The parameters α and δ now appear as a sum, rather than 
a difference (as they did in the Actual Loss formulas). Only platform i is changing 
price, not the hypothetical monopolist of both products. A higher δ means that in 
response to an increase in the price to side A at platform i, more side B customers  
 
 









switch to platform j rather than to nothing at all. This makes j more attractive to side 
A, causing the market shrinking feedback effects to begin, and hurting platform i. 
Thus, higher values of both α and δ penalize price increases more and lead to lower 
markups in equilibrium. 
Overall, for a given set of short-run own-price and cross-price elasticities, 
two-sided pressures lower equilibrium markups below that which the one-sided 
Lerner Index would predict. One-sided estimates of short-run own-price elasticity 
derived from markups overstate the true elasticity and understate the profitability of 
potential price effects.  We now turn to a demonstration of the potential “Estimation” 
and “Lerner” Biases from using one-sided formulas in situations involving 
symmetric MSPs. 
 
IV.  COMPARISON OF ONE AND TWO-SIDED CRITICAL LOSS: SOME 
SIMULATIONS 
Assume that two platforms each serve sides A and B, and as an example, 
assume a relevant antitrust market is proposed that would include the products on 
side A of these two platforms. The test would be the same if we were considering a 
merger between the two platforms and wanted to know if a given price increase on 
side A would be profitable for the merged entity.
22 We again maintain the 
assumption of symmetric platforms.   




A A Q Q / ∆  and 
B B Q Q / ∆ , to get: 















ω ω                               (12) 
which holds when Critical Loss equals Actual Loss exactly. It is clear that the 
equation is really a weighted sum of the ratios of Actual Loss to Critical Loss on 
each side, where the weight is given by 
                                                 
22 We could also assume price increases on both sides A and B, and the same qualitative results still hold.  
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We refer to the left hand side of this equation, in absolute value, as the Actual-
Critical Loss Ratio (ACR). If the ACR is greater than 1, Actual Loss exceeds Critical 
Loss, and the price increase would not be profitable. The relevant market would be 
expanded. If ACR is less than 1, the price increase is more than profitable and the 
relevant market contracted. The ACR represents a measure of the closeness of the 
Actual and Critical Loss.
23 Note that if the industry were truly one-sided, so that L
B = 
0 after a price increase on side A, this equation reduces to the ratio of Actual Loss to 
Critical Loss that would be applicable with one-sided firms. 
    To begin, assume that the short-run own-price elasticities are well estimated 
and the analyst does not depend on the (one-sided) Lerner Index. We see the one-
sided calculations are biased towards a lower ACR, and the bias grows as the indirect 
network externalities become more important. Figure 1 plots the ACR against the 
own-price elasticity β for several different values of the cross-side own-platform 
externality α. Recall the parameter α represents the short run percentage change in a 
platform’s side A business due to a 1% change in demand on its side B business, and 
vice versa. The figure includes both the ACR calculated using the one-sided formula 
(which assumes α and δ are both zero), and also using the correct two-sided formula 
for MSPs. Other parameters are held constant, and the price increase to side A is 
taken to be 5%.
24  
    First, and as we would expect, the ACR increases as the short-run own-price 
elasticity increases in both calculations for a given α.  There is an indirect effect of 
higher β through markups that increases Critical Loss, but the direct effect of β that 
increases Actual Loss dominates, and the ACR rises with β.  
    The calculated effect of the own-platform cross-side externality α on the 
ACR, however, depends on the calculation being used. In the two-sided calculation, a 
                                                 
23 The derivation assumes X
A ≠ 0 and X
B ≠ 0. When X
B = 0, the second term reduces to  B A A B B L X R M R ) / ( . 
24 The assumption of 5% is often used but arbitrary.  
 
 









higher α is associated with stronger feedback effects, which result in greater Actual 
Loss and greater ACR following a price increase, all else equal. In contrast, the ACR 
falls under the one-sided calculation. This is because the Actual Loss calculated with 
the one-sided formulas ( A A A X ) ( γ β − ) is independent of α, but the Critical Loss is 
greater since observed equilibrium markups are lower with higher α. The gap 
between the ACRs under the two calculations grow with higher α, and with higher β. 
    Figure 2 plots the “critical beta” under each calculation against the cross-side 
own-platform externality α. The critical beta is the value of the own price elasticity, 
conditional on the other parameters, that would cause Actual Loss to exactly equal 
Critical Loss. The area between the one and two-sided critical β’s is the region of 
error: the combinations of α and β for which a contraction of the proposed antitrust 
market would be called for under the one-sided calculation when an expansion of the 
proposed market should be called instead. In merger analyses these would be the 
combinations of α and β for which the analyst would conclude from the one-sided 
calculation that the hypothetical monopolist in a market definition analysis or the 
merged entity in the unilateral effects analysis would significantly increase prices 
when in fact it could not.  
    The figure shows that as the indirect network effects become stronger, the 
region of error grows wider. The corresponding figure for the “critical gamma”, with 
β held fixed (not shown), yields the same conclusion.   
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    In these examples, it is assumed that the short-run elasticities are properly 
estimated; only the formulas used differ. However, if the analyst relies on the (one-
sided) Lerner Index to estimate the own price elasticity of demand, and then uses the 
usual one-sided formulas, the bias goes in the other direction. The analyst will 
overestimate the short-run and long-run own price elasticities of the MSPs and will 
overestimate Actual Loss. The one-sided Critical Loss calculation is unchanged 
(because it is based on observed markups) and so the ACR will be erroneously high. 
In other words, profitable price increases will not be expected for even relatively low 
values of the true short-run own-price elasticity β. The critical betas and the region of 
error are plotted in Figure 3, and this time the critical betas are lower under the one-
sided calculation than under the two-sided one. In the region of error, the analyst who 
relies on the one-sided calculations would recommend an expansion of the antitrust 
market when a contraction should be called for, or would conclude that merging 
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Figure 3. Region of Error, Mismeasured β in One-Sided Calculations  
 
 









The asymmetric platform case, given by formulas set out in the appendix, is 
more involved. When platforms are asymmetric but the price increases considered on 
any side are equal across platforms, the biases move in the same directions as in the 
symmetric case. However, when platforms are asymmetric and price increases 
considered are also allowed to differ across products, the direction of the bias also 
depends on the degree of asymmetry and the particular mix of price increases. 
Differential price increases are most likely of interest in merger analyses where 
antitrust concern may center around particular product offerings. (In market 
definition exercises, the price increases deemed significant is generally held equal 
across platform (e.g. 5% or 10%).) The reason differential price increases are 
important is because they result in a shift in the relative sizes of the platforms and 
generate feedback effects. If the platform is asymmetric enough, the impact of certain 
price increases will be overstated, and others understated.
25  
As an example, consider a proposed merger where the platforms differ 
significantly in initial profitability. A price increase at the low-margin platform will 
be beneficial for the firm if network effects are strong and doing so generates enough 
customers switching to its high-margin platform. One-sided calculations do not 
account for this possibility, and as a result, understate the profitability of this price 
increase. If we consider a price change at only the high-margin platform, we can get 
an opposite bias. The profitability of the price increase would be overstated by a one-
sided calculation as long as the gain from expansion of the low-margin platform 
cannot compensate for the contraction of demand at the high-margin platform. Thus, 
when asymmetric platforms and asymmetric price changes are considered, the 
direction of the biases depends on the specific question being asked as well as the 
method used.  
                                                 
25 Across all four potential price changes of a given equal amount, the “average” bias from those price changes 
collectively goes in the same direction as that in the symmetric case, which in turn depends on the analytical 
method used. However, in the asymmetric case there is variation in the size of these biases and with sufficiently 
asymmetric firms, some may have the reverse sign. Because differential price changes act as weights in Actual 
Loss (equation A.4), the overall bias can go in the opposite direction of the symmetric case if the reverse-signed 
biases are sufficiently highly weighted.  
 
 









V.  ANALYSIS OF UNILATERAL EFFECTS: GOOGLE’S ACQUISITION 
OF DOUBLECLICK 
On April 13 Google announced that it had reached an agreement to purchase 
DoubleClick for $3.1 billion. Google is a provider of online advertising services for 
web publishers and advertisers in addition to operating a search-engine that sells 
advertising space.  DoubleClick is principally a provider of server-based software 
tools and services for managing online advertising for web publishers and 
advertisers.
26  This section uses data on margins for Google and DoubleClick along 
with other assumptions on their competitive relationships to show how the techniques 
used above can be employed.  Our purpose is not to assess whether or not the merger 
would in fact have competitive effects – that would entail a much more detailed 
analysis than is possible here – but rather to illustrate a practical application of the 
two-sided critical loss framework.
27  Furthermore, there is a remarkable lack of 
publicly available data on the relevant products and services and many of the 
numbers reported below are based on estimates from a variety of sources. 
Web publishers make space available on their web pages for advertisements. 
Their ad inventory corresponds roughly to the number of people that will view each 
space over some given time period.
28  Advertisers are on the other side of the market. 
They buy advertising inventory to reach consumers. The online advertising business 
that is relevant to the Google-DoubleClick transaction is basically about how this 
advertising inventory is bought and sold.
29 
Publishers create advertising inventory by designing their web pages to 
accept graphical, text, or video ads in various portions of the page. The amount of 
                                                 
26As of the writing of this paper the merger is under review by the Federal Trade Commission and the European 
Commission.    
27 The authors have been consultants to several parties that have sought close scrutiny of the transaction on the 
part of the relevant competition authorities and have argued that the transaction could significantly lessen 
competition in various markets.  
28 Advertisers value the demographic and other characteristics of viewers in addition to their sheer number. Thus 
views by high-income residents of Boston are more valuable to the local BMW dealer than views by low-income 
resident or high-income residents of Topeka. 
29 The more developed part of the online advertising business consists of search.  Search-engines supply 
advertising inventory on their search-results pages and thereby compete with regular publishers for advertiser 
dollars.  Search engines are also relevant to Web 2.0 because they are the way people often find websites either 
through organic search results or through advertising.  
 
 









inventory they can supply then depends on the viewers they attract to these pages. 
This supply is highly heterogeneous for two primary reasons. First, like newspapers, 
some space is seen as more desirable than others – the top right is more desirable 
than the bottom left because people are more likely to pay attention to the former 
than the latter.  Second, some viewers are worth more to advertisers than other 
viewers, and the technology of online advertising enables publishers and advertisers 
to establish prices for viewers with particular characteristics.   
Like all sellers and buyers, publishers and advertisers require ways to identify 
optimal trading opportunities and to establish transaction prices.  There are two major 
ways that this “intermediation” occurs.  First, it can occur directly through bilateral 
exchanges between publishers and advertisers.  eBay for example, may sell Nokia the 
right to present an advertisement in a particular spot to viewers with specific 
characteristics by having its sales agents deal directly with Nokia’s buying agents. 
Second, it can occur indirectly through multilateral exchanges between publishers 
and advertisers using advertising networks.  Hearst Publishing may sell ValueClick – 
an advertising network – advertising inventory from its various online newspaper and 
magazine properties, which ValueClick will then sell to advertisers who want to 
reach the kind of viewers that Heart Magazines has. The advertiser in this case 
typically buys access to a type of viewer –“fashion conscious young women in 
upscale locations” – but has not specifically bought space on Cosmopolitan’s 
website.   The extent to which advertisers and publishers use direct and indirect 
methods of distribution for advertising varies. Smaller ones typically rely only on 
indirect methods because it is not economical to carry the cost of salespeople and 
purchasing agents. Google’s AdSense network is especially popular with small 
advertisers and publishers in part for this reason. 
This section concentrates on large web publishers, which account for the 
preponderance of advertising revenue and large advertisers, which account for the 
preponderance of online spending.
 30 A significant part of the advertising inventory 
                                                 
30 A large publisher refers to one which is sufficiently large to use stand-alone tools to serve their directly sold ads 
and any remnant ads sold through non-integrated and/or integrated ad networks. This includes at least the top 500  
 
 









bought and sold by these large advertisers and publishers involves bilateral exchange.  
Large publishers either have direct sales forces or hire third-party sales reps to sell 
their ad inventory. Likewise, large advertisers have purchasing agents or, more often, 
use media buyers at their advertising agency to purchase ad inventory.  Advertising 
inventory sold this way is said to be “reserved”.  Large publishers often sell their 
“premium ad space” this way.  
Large publishers often also rely on other intermediaries to sell ad inventory 
indirectly that they have not “reserved” for advertisers directly.  These intermediaries 
are called “advertising networks”. Publishers may use ad networks because they are 
more efficient than a direct sales force for some, or all, of their ad inventory; or 
because they have excess inventory that they have not sold directly, perhaps because 
of spikes in viewers. Advertisers use ad networks because it is another way to reach 
viewers.  Hard estimates are difficult to come by, but advertisers and publishers we 
have talked to seem to agree that somewhere around 30 percent of advertising 
revenue for large publishers is sold indirectly, as well as more than 50 percent of 
advertising impressions (the number of viewers of an ad); this figure appears to vary 
significantly across publishers depending on the way they have chosen to manage 
their advertising business.  On average, advertising inventory sold indirectly costs 
less than advertising inventory sold directly because the space is less desirable than 
the directly sold space. 
There are several aspects of advertisers’ management of their online 
campaigns, as well as publishers’ management of their sales of advertising inventory. 
As discussed previously, advertisers and publishers need intermediation services. For 
bilateral exchanges they may use some combination of in-house and third-party 
providers, while for multilateral exchanges they mainly use advertising networks. 
Advertisers and publishers likewise need management, reporting, and technology 
solutions such as those offered by DoubleClick and aQuantive.  These tend to be 
server-based software that can help manage advertising inventory and campaigns that 
                                                                                                                                           
publishers, and accounts for the majority of advertising revenues.  Smaller publishers do not find it economically 
efficient to hire direct sales forces. They usually rely on an ad network to sell their ad inventory.  
 
 









may involve millions of ad impressions (that is, views of an ad by an individual) a 
day. These server-based software tools are highly sophisticated mission-critical 
applications. 
Large publishers usually use a publisher tool such as DoubleClick’s Dart for 
Publishers (DFP).
31,32 This tool is typically hosted on a web server maintained by the 
provider. The publisher hardcodes links to the publisher tool to fill the ad space for 
which it wants to use the management, reporting, and serving capabilities of the 
publisher tool. It will also typically integrate the publisher tool into many other 
aspects of the website technology and business practices. As an example of how such 
publisher tools are used, consider a visit to www.cnn.com. When the entertainment 
page of www.cnn.com is clicked, a decision is made as to which ad to present to the 
user and, once chosen, the ad is displayed so the user can see it, and the publisher can 
earn some money.  The publisher –  in this case www.cnn.com – uses its publisher 
tools to check whether the particular ad space that the user is about to see has been 
“reserved”, and if not, whether there is an ad network that can fill that inventory 
space. The publisher tool then retrieves the chosen ad and presents it to the user.  
This entire process happens in the blink of an eye.  Publishers will typically only use 
one publisher tool (i.e., they “single-home” on tools).  
Large advertisers and advertising agencies often have an advertiser tool such 
as DoubleClick’s Dart for Advertisers (DFA).
33  Large advertisers typically manage 
advertising on hundreds of websites and across numerous products using many 
methods of online advertising. This tool helps them manage these various campaigns.  
Advertisers usually use one advertiser tool although advertising agencies may use 
several.  However, single-homing does appear to be the norm.   
A few providers offer more or less complete solutions for advertisers and 
publishers.  Google’s AdSense/AdWords platform is one of these. Publishers can 
                                                 
31 See http://www.doubleclick.com/products/dfp/index.aspx  
32 A handful of mega-large publishers such as MSN have their own proprietary tools but most others use a third-
party tool. 
33 See http://www.doubleclick.com/products/dfa/index.aspx   
 
 









hardcode ad space to Google’s AdSense
34 which takes care of everything – selling 
the inventory, managing the ad space, serving ads to the viewer, and sending the 
publisher a portion of the proceeds after taking a commission.
35 Advertisers, 
likewise, can buy space from the Google Content Network
36 through AdWords
37 
(which bundles Google’s search-based and contextual-based advertising products). 
Yahoo! and Microsoft offer similar all-inclusive solutions.  These solutions have all 
resulted from leveraging the technologies developed for search-based advertising – 
especially the keyword bidding auctions – to the buying and selling of publisher ad 
inventory.  Some other ad networks are also integrated to lesser degrees; they may 
offer publishers serving technologies so that publishers can hardcode ad network into 
particular space. Many large publishers use an integrated platform for contextual ads 
and an unintegrated platform (based on a particular publisher tool) for non-contextual 
ads; the unintegrated platform is used to access multiple standalone ad networks, as 
well as ads sold directly. 
Online advertising is highly differentiated.  It comes in different forms such 
as graphic ads that mix pictures and text, all text ads, and video ads; appears in 
different places on websites; and is targeted to viewers in various ways.  It is also 
bought and sold in different ways which leads to differentiation in terms of the 
distribution channels used by advertisers and publishers.  The underlying economics 
and driver of substitution are fairly straightforward.  Publishers are interested in 
maximizing the rate of return on investment in their ad inventory. Advertisers are 
interested in maximizing the rate of return on investment from their advertising 
spending- which ultimately means getting consumers to buy things.  Advertiser and 
publisher decisions on ROI are interlinked because online advertising is 
fundamentally a two-sided business, as discussed below. 
                                                 
34 See https://www.google.com/adsense/login/en_US/  
35 In the online advertising Traffic Acquisitions Costs (TAC) refers to what an advertising platform pays for 
traffic.  Google pays TAC to publishers in return for contributing their advertising inventory to the Google 
Content Network.  The publisher receives TAC. In this case 1-TAC is the percent commission paid by the 
publisher to Google for selling its ad inventory.  If Google pays the publisher 80% of the revenue that Google 
receives from the advertiser the publisher has paid a commission of 20% to Google.  
36 See https://adwords.google.com/select/afc.html  
37 See http://adwords.google.com/select/Login   
 
 









Surveys of large websites show that DFP is used by somewhat more than half 
of these websites. Larger sites are more likely than smaller sites to have DFP. DFP 
has about 63 percent share based on page views.
38 DFA holds roughly a 26 percent 
share of non-search advertiser tools.
39 Google is the leading integrated ad platform.  
Estimates suggest that Google accounts for 51 percent of the ad revenue through the 
indirect channel and 27 percent overall. The unintegrated ad networks account for an 
estimated 45 percent of ad revenue through the indirect channel and 25 percent of 
web publisher ad spending overall.
40 
Following the acquisition, Google would have control of a key input into the 
unintegrated channel for selling ads directly and indirectly. It would have the ability 
to coordinate the price of DFP, and through DFP, the overall price of distribution 
through the direct sales and through the ad networks.
41  The question we consider is 
whether the combined entity would have the incentive to alter prices significantly.  
Two-sided effects are important for analyzing this question because changes in the 
prices of the inputs alter the advertiser’s demand for space as well as the publisher’s 
demand for selling through a particular method. 
Table 1 reports the data and sources we have relied on. The key data is that on 
margin, which shows that both Google and DoubleClick earn roughly 75 percent 
gross margins.  Ad inventory sells on average, with great dispersion, for about $2 per 
thousand impressions (that is, views by users). Google sells on a cost per click basis 
but obtains the equivalent of approximately 40¢ per thousand impressions based on 
the evidence we have seen.
42  Publishers typically pay 40¢ per thousand impressions 
                                                 
38 The survey conducted by LECG shows that AdSense is used on 50% of all websites sampled. DoubleClick is 
used on 63% of all websites sampled. A second survey conducted by Keystone Strategy for American viewers 
shows that AdSense is used on 45% of surveyed sites while DoubleClick is used on 61%. 
39 This is based on aQuantive’s estimates of shares for itself and DoubleClick in advertiser tools (among providers 
that sell those as standalone non-integrated products), adjusted for those advertiser tools that are sold on an 
integrated basis (with the ads), by providers such as AdSense. 
40 Source: Keystone Strategy. 
41 We focus on price effects as is traditional in this sort of analysis. Google could engage in a variety of other 
strategies post-acquisition that could involve the exercise of acquired market power but that do not necessarily 
involve increasing prices. 
42 The revenue paid by advertisers by publishers is estimated at around $2 CPM of which publishers keep 
approximately 80%.  See http://www.mydigitallife.info/2006/10/21/google-adsense-giving-publishers-average-of-
78-revenue-share/  and  http://www.webmasterworld.com/forum89/6913.htm  
 
 









on average to the standalone ad networks and 5¢ per thousand impressions to the 
publisher tool provider.  
 
 DFP  DFA  AdSense  Source 
Unit price 
(cpm) 
5¢ 7.5¢  40¢ 
 
Discussions with publishers. The 
revenue paid to Google by advertisers 
is estimated at around $2 CPM of 




75%  75%  75%  DoubleClick’s gross margin according 
to its 2004 Form 10K was 74%. 
According to Google’s 2006 Form 
10K its costs of earning revenue (net 
of traffic acquisition costs paid to 
publishers) are around 10% of total 
revenues. This implies its gross 
margin on AdSense is 90%.Its overall 
gross margin (for search and non-
search ad programs) has been between 
50-70% in the past five years. We use 
75% as reasonable. 
Revenues $325m    $196m  Google’s  2004 revenues on third party 
ads after paying publishers. 
DoubleClick’s 2004 revenues for 
“Tech Solutions” which appears to 
mainly be comprised of DART 
products. 
Table 1. Data and Sources. 
We want to ask whether the merged Google-DoubleClick entity would have 
the ability to increase the price of DFP by X%, holding all else constant. This was a 
central point of concern with the merger. Google’s AdSense is an integrated product, 
and so charges higher markups than DoubleClick’s DFP. This suggests it might be 
advantageous for Google to raise the price of DFP and shift publishers to its AdSense 
network.
43 In the analysis, we take X to be either 5% or 10%. Since the platforms are 
                                                 
43 In the two-sided calculation, we attribute 2/5
th of the Google unit price and revenues to the publishing side and 
3/5
th to the advertising side, to match the DoubleClick ratio. These are the expected side-specific prices that 
Google would charge had advertisers paid publishers directly for the advertising space and each paid Google a 
commission for the value of the tools and intermediation services provided. This avoids the need for negative 
prices and negative externality parameters in the calibration, which adds transparency.  
 
 









inherently asymmetric, the analysis uses the formulas set out in the appendix. Ex 
ante, the direction of bias from using the one-sided calculation in the two-sided 
setting is unknown.  
Given the limited data available, calibration is the most feasible approach.
44 .  
For the one-sided calculation, there are four parameters to estimate (all on the 
publisher side), using a combination of data and restrictions based in economic 
theory. First, we use the theoretical Lerner Index to fix the own-price elasticities 
given the observed markups (two restrictions). As discussed, the use of the one-sided 
Lerner Index in a two-sided setting yields a biased estimate of the true price 
elasticities. We also assume Slutsky symmetry, which equates quantity-weighted 
cross-price elasticities across platforms (one restriction). We then just need to 
calibrate one of the cross-price elasticities and we could calculate Critical Loss and 
Actual Loss. However, instead we employ the common and useful technique in 
calibration exercises to set Critical Loss equal Actual Loss (the fourth restriction) and 
then back out the values of the cross-price elasticities (connected together by Slutsky 
symmetry) that would exactly equate CL and AL.  
In the two-sided model there are sixteen parameters total in the demand 
system that we need to estimate using a combination of data and economic theory, 
i.e. sixteen restrictions. First, we use the two-sided version of the Lerner Index given 
by equations (11). Conditional on the externality parameters, this yields a linear 
relation between each own-price elasticity and its corresponding cross-price 
elasticity. We keep Slutsky symmetry, a similar symmetry for the externality 
parameters, and seek out the “most symmetric” solution. We assume two-sided 
effects are conservatively small, with own-platform cross-side externalities of 10%. 
The restrictions are explained in more detail in the footnote.
45  
                                                 
44 Given enough time a competition authority could possible obtain sufficient data from members of the industry 
and through surveys to obtain estimates from demand-system estimation. 
45 The two-sided Lerner Index accounts for four restrictions, each relating an own-price elasticity with a 
corresponding cross-price elasticity. We assume Slutsky symmetry that ensures consistency in the cross-price 
elasticities on each side (four restrictions) and a similar restriction to ensure consistency across the indirect 
network externalities on a given side (four restrictions). Our results do not change qualitatively if we loosen the 
assumption of Slutsky symmetry, however. We assume Google’s own-platform cross-side externality is 0.1 on 
each side, and its cross-side cross-platform externality 0.05 on each side (four more restrictions). Under Slutsky  
 
 









In total, these add to fifteen restrictions. Again, we equate Critical Loss and 
Actual Loss as the sixteenth restriction, and back out the own- and cross-price 
elasticities (connected together by the other restrictions) that would exactly equate 
CL and AL.  
    Following common practice, we report the easily interpretable “critical 
diversion ratios” and “critical switching levels” rather than the β’s and γ’s 
themselves.
46 The critical diversion ratio is defined as the fraction of the quantities 
lost at DoubleClick’s DFP that needs to be immediately recaptured by Google’s 
AdSense platform, for a price increase in DFP to be profitable once the indirect 
network feedback effects work themselves out. It is effectively the quantity-weighted 
ratio of the cross-price elasticity (of AdSense’s quantity with respect to the price of 
DFP) to the own-price elasticity (of DFP). The Critical Switching Level is defined as 
the fraction of the total quantities of DFP that needs to be immediately recaptured by 
AdSense after a price increase for the increase to be profitable once all feedback 
effects are worked out. It is calculated as the AdSense-quantity-weighted cross-price 
elasticity to total DFP quantity. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
symmetry in the two-sided parameters, the corresponding values for DoubleClick are 0.1 and 0.005. We also 
assume the “most symmetric solution” across sides (one restriction). This is because, conditional on the 
externalities, many combinations of β and γ are technically possible. A relatively low β on one side could exist 
and satisfy the markup condition if the corresponding γ is extremely high. Note that the effect of a change in β is 
about 1/α times the effect of a change in γ in the markup equations. But this causes an opposite stress on the other 
side, in order to equate AL and CL (see below). This tends to force the other β to be relatively low, and the other γ 
to be extremely small – generally negative with a similarly large magnitude as the γ on the first side. The more 
reasonable solution is that which yields the most symmetric β’s and γ’s, conditional on all the other constraints. In 
a fully symmetric model this ensures a symmetric solution; in an asymmetric model the β’s and γ’s still differ 
across sides. It is implemented by minimizing the sum of squares of the γ’s across sides (alternatively, the sum of 
squares of the β’s across sides.) The total number of calibrated values plus restrictions adds to 15. We could then 
fix one of the β’s or one of the γ’s to complete the model. Instead, we force CL=AL as the sixteenth restriction, 
and back out the critical β’s and γ’s (tied together by the above constraints) that would result in CL equaling AL. 
46 See Shapiro (1996).  
 
 










  5% Critical Price 
Increase 












0.83%  0.00%  1.67%    0.01% 
Critical switching 
levels 
0.06% 0.00% 0.22%  0.00% 
Table 2. Critical Diversion Ratios and Switching Levels 
    Table 2 reports the critical diversion ratios and critical switching levels under 
our best data assumptions, for both the one-sided and two-sided calculations, and for 
critical price increases (X) of 5% and 10%.  
    Given the high markups in the industry, and the large differential in absolute 
margins between AdSense and DFP or DFA, the results show generally that it is 
likely the Google-DoubleClick entity would be able to increase the price of DFP by 
five or ten percent, even when the amount switching between platforms is very low. 
That is, Google-DoubleClick would need only a few of the customers it loses after 
increasing price at DFP to switch to AdSense, instead of switching to a competing 
platform or not buying at all (given by the critical diversion ratio). It needs even 
fewer of its total publishing customers to switch to AdSense (given by the critical 
switching level).
47 
    While all the numbers are low due to the nature of the proposed merger, the 
critical diversion ratios and switching levels implied by the one-sided results turn out 
to significantly overestimate the two-sided calculations. In other words, the one-sided 
calculation understates the potential for unilateral price effects from the merger. 
Whereas the one-sided numbers allow for a small possibility that the price increase 
would not be profitable, the two-sided calculations suggest that Google is likely to 
raise prices on DFP even if virtually no customers switched to AdSense.  
                                                 
47 We present this analysis to demonstrate the effect of two-sided considerations on standard diversion ratio 
analysis.  Whether and under what circumstances it is appropriate to conclude from this sort of analysis that a 
merger should be blocked is much more complicated issue which we do not address in this article.   
 
 









    This creates a “region of error” between the critical diversion ratios. If the 
actual diversion ratio is below the one-sided figure and above the two-sided figure, it 
would result in different conclusions depending on the calculation. The one-sided 
calculation would suggest profitable price increases, the two-sided calculation would 
not. The same is true for actual switching levels. 
    The finding of profitable price increases with an effectively zero cross-price 
elasticity in the two-sided calculation might be surprising. Merging firms in a one-
sided world only raise price above its formerly profit-maximizing level if doing so 
directly causes customers to switch to its other products, i.e. a large enough cross-
price elasticity. The reason why zero switching levels are plausible in the two-sided 
case is because of the indirect network externalities. By raising the price of DFP, 
DoubleClick loses publishers and, via the feedback effects, also loses advertisers, 
then more publishers, more advertisers and so on. As the DoubleClick platform 
shrinks and its value deteriorates, advertisers and publishers switch to other 
platforms, including Google’s AdSense.
48 The increase in profits to Google from this 
switching, which is driven by changes in platform size rather than changes in relative 
prices directly, makes the price increase on DFP profitable. Hence, Google benefits 
from contracting and devaluing the low (absolute) margin DoubleClick platform to 
increase the relative value of its high (absolute) margin AdSense platform.
49 
                                                 
48 Customers who are sensitive to platform size, even if perfectly price inelastic, make this switch. 
49 The fact that Google can profit from DFP price increases that are purely contractionary suggests that other non-
price methods of shrinking the relative size of the DoubleClick platform can also be profitable. Quality 
degradation is an example. More likely, however, Google could tie intermediation services to its tools software on 
the DoubleClick platform, as it currently does on AdSense. This would foreclose third party networks and direct 
sales channels for intermediation, and effectively convert DoubleClick from a low-margin platform to a high-
margin platform like AdSense.  
 
 














5% Critical Price 
Increase 
 
10% Critical Price 
Increase 








7 75% 40 75%  1.17%  0.00%  2.33%  0.74% 
7 50% 40 75%  1.17%  0.00%  2.33%  0.74% 
7 25% 40 75%  1.17%  0.00%  2.33%  0.74% 
             
5 75% 40 75%  0.83%  0.00%  1.67%  0.01% 
5 50% 40 75%  0.83%  0.00%  1.67%  0.01% 
5 25% 40 75%  0.83%  0.00%  1.67%  0.01% 
             
3 75% 40 75%  0.50%  0.00%  1.00%  0.00% 
3 50% 40 75%  0.50%  0.00%  1.00%  0.00% 
3 25% 40 75%  0.50%  0.00%  1.00%  0.00% 
             
5 75% 60 90%  0.46%  0.00%  0.93%  0.00% 
5 75% 60 75%  0.56%  0.00%  1.11%  0.01% 
5 75% 60 50%  0.83%  0.00%  1.67%  1.02% 
             
5 75% 40 90%  0.69%  0.00%  1.39%  0.00% 
5 75% 40 75%  0.83%  0.00%  1.67%  0.01% 
5 75% 40 50%  1.25%  0.00%  2.50%  1.53% 
             
5 75% 20 90%  1.39%  0.00%  2.78%  0.00% 
5 75% 20 75%  1.67%  0.00%  3.33%  0.03% 
5 75% 20 50%  2.50%  0.00%  5.00%  3.06% 
           
5 50% 40 90%  0.69% 0.00%  1.39% 0.00% 
5 50% 40 50%  1.25% 0.00%  2.50% 1.53% 













    Table 3 performs robustness checks and reports critical diversion ratios over a 
wide range of data assumptions.
50  The same patterns hold for critical switching 
levels. The two-sided calculation is often zero, and always zero for 5% price 
increases, given the high markups involved.  
    In summary, we have demonstrated that one-sided and two-sided calculations 
yield different critical diversion ratios (and critical switching levels) and open up a 
region of error between them. The size of this region of error depends on the data and 
externality assumptions, but is non-trivial as a general rule. If the actual diversion 
ratio falls in between the one- and two-sided calculations, the analyst would give the 
wrong recommendation about the unilateral price effects of the proposed Google-
DoubleClick merger. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
Traditional methods for evaluating mergers between single-sided firms can 
lead to erroneous conclusions when mergers involve MSPs. The direction of the bias 
depends on the analytical technique used, with traditional demand estimation tending 
to draw markets too narrowly and overstating competitive effects, and Lerner Index 
based calibration methods drawing markets too broadly and understating competitive 
effects.  The direction of bias can also vary with the degree of platform asymmetry 
and the particular set of products that are subject to price increases. When mergers 
involve MSPs, the correct analysis must account for the indirect network effects 
between the multiple sides and the consequent effect on prices and output for the 
multiple sides. Failing to do so can lead to material mistakes as we have shown 
through the simulations reported above. 
Although we have focused on the numerical mistakes that can result from the 
application of one-sided methods to markets with multi-sided businesses, it is 
important to emphasize that most profound analytical mistake in this context results 
                                                 
50 Except as noted, all other data assumptions remain the same.  
 
 









from settling on a one-sided market when the products involve are fundamentally 
two-sided.  This has been the case in, for example, the interchange fee cases in which 
competition authorities have focused on the impact of the fees paid by merchant 
acquirers to card issuers in a merchant acquiring market, thereby ignoring the fact 
that the merchant and cardholder sides are inextricably interlinked.
51 
We are dubious that the light generated by market definition analysis in 
markets involving MSPs is worth the candle. The proper analysis is difficult and 
highly dependent on proper modeling and data. Mistakes that result in narrow 
markets that assume away clear multi-sided effects are quite costly.  Although the 
analysis of unilateral effects is also challenging, our advice to practitioners is to 
avoid formalistic market definition exercises and to use one’s candles to illuminate 
the effects of the merger on prices and other dimensions of competition. 
 
 
                                                 
51 See Klein et al. (2006), Evans and Schmalensee (2005a, b).  
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A. APPENDIX. N-PLATFORM AND ASYMMETRIC PLATFORM CASES 
  We extend the results in the text to the case of asymmetric platforms and to the 
case of more than two platforms. The Critical Loss equation for two asymmetric 



























M X R                                (A.1) 
The N platform formula differs only in the number of summed terms. This 
formulation allows different price changes at each platform on each side for use in a 
variety of questions.  
 
 





























i p p q q q γ β δ α µ + − − + =                                   (A.2) 
for i,j = 1, 2, i≠j and s = A, B, where lower case q’s and p’s represent log values. 







s < 1 and αi
s + δj
s < 1 to prevent the two-sided effects from exploding.  
  Since this a demand system, ownership patterns do not matter for estimation. 
Also, if there are two platforms that both sell to side A, it is not necessary that they 
both sell to side B. The two “side B’s” can refer to completely different goods. It 
may also be that one platform sells to sides A and B, whereas another firm sells only 
to side A, and a third firm only sells to side B.  
  The reduced form value of 
s
j q  as a function only of parameters and prices, 
accounting for all the feedbacks in the system, is: 
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Totally differentiating, and replacing all 
s
i dp  with 
s
i X  and 
s
i dq  with 
s
i L , we derive 
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         (A.4) 
  The analyst then compares Actual Loss and Critical Loss as described in the text.  
The analysis can further be extended to N platforms. The Actual Loss formula is 
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γ µ θ  
Quantity at platform i on side s depends on the quantity at each platform k (including 
i) on the other side r (the δik’s), and the price at each platform (including i) on side s 
(the γik’s).
52 Substituting each 
r
i q  equation into each 
s
i q  equation, the system can be 
rewritten in matrix form: 
s s s Φ = ϑ ∆  for each side s, where ∆




ij λ  equal to 









1 ) ( 1 δ δ λ                                  (A.6) 
where 1(i = j) is an indicator function equal to one when i = j and zero otherwise. 
Also, 
s ϑ  is a N-vector with i
th element equal to 
s
i q , and 
s Φ  is an N-vector with i
th 
element equal to 
s
i φ , where: 
                                                 
52 We have replaced the notation αi from the two-platform version with δii’s and the coefficient on own price from 
βi with γii’s.  
 
 






















                                            (A.7) 
Actual Loss is calculated for each 
s
i q  by total differentiation, i.e. 
s s s d L Φ ∆ =
−1 ) ( , 
for s = A,B, replacing each 
s
i dp  with 
s
i X  in the 
s
i dφ  terms. 
  To close the model, we note that the first order conditions defining markups 
in the two-platform symmetric case are the same as those in the 2-platform and N-
platform asymmetric cases, since each set of equations is platform specific.  
As before, the calculated Actual Loss amounts 
s
j X  are substituted into the 
Critical Loss equation and the ACR is checked. (Alternatively, one can fix all 
parameters except one, and use the ACR = 1 identity to back out the “critical” value 
of the remaining parameter.) The comparative statics from the symmetric and two-
platform cases carry through to the N firm asymmetric case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 